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Charkaoui and Secret Evidence
Gus Van Harten*

I. INTRODUCTION
In its decision in Charkaoui,1 the Supreme Court of Canada held that
the process under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act2 — by
which permanent residents and foreign nationals could be detained
following their designation by the executive as inadmissible to Canada
on security grounds, subject to review by a judge of the Federal Court —
was unconstitutional. In its reasons,3 the Court found that this process
impaired the individual’s right to life, liberty and security of the person
and that this did not accord with the principles of fundamental justice as
required under section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms.4 The Court concluded in particular that the Act’s provision
for a judge to review secret evidence5 put forward by the executive to
justify its designation and detention of the individual in question did not
ensure a fair hearing because the absence of the individual from the
proceeding undermined the judge’s ability to come to a decision based
on all the relevant facts and law, while the judge lacked the full and
independent powers to gather evidence that exist in an inquisitorial
process, and because the individual’s right to know the case to meet had
*

Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, and former legal
advisor to the commissioner of the Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in
Relation to Maher Arar. All views expressed and errors made in this article are those of the author.
1
Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] S.C.J. No. 9, [2007] 1
S.C.R. 350 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Charkaoui”].
2
S.C. 2001, c. 27.
3
I refer to the reasons as those of the Court although the unanimous judgment was
delivered by McLachlin C.J.C.
4
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. Although not the subject of this article, the Court also concluded
that the process subjected foreign nationals who are not permanent residents to arbitrary detention
because it denied them a prompt hearing (in violation of s. 9 and s. 10(c) of the Charter and not
saved under s. 1) and to address this the Court extended to foreign nationals the same access to
adjudicative review as provided to permanent residents.
5
“Secret evidence” is the author’s term, not the Court’s, and it refers to evidence to which
the individual (and the public) is denied access; “closed proceedings” means adjudicative
proceedings that permit secret evidence.
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been “effectively gutted”.6 Further, this infringement of section 7 was
not justified under section 1 because the process did not provide for
alternative procedural mechanisms to accommodate the use of secret
evidence, such as the appointment of a separate counsel (as in the case of
the Security Intelligence Review Committee or the Arar Inquiry) or
special advocate (as in the United Kingdom) to represent the individual’s
interests and challenge the state’s claims in closed proceedings. Thus,
the Court struck down the existing review process and its reliance on a
judge alone as the sole check on the executive in closed proceedings.7
At the core of Charkaoui is the Court’s confrontation with the
dilemmas of secret evidence. The use of secret evidence threatens to
erode the integrity of adjudicative decision-making in at least three
ways. First, it increases the risk of error and injustice to the individual.
Second, it undermines confidence in the administration of justice. Third,
it dilutes the effectiveness of adjudication as a check against abuse of
state power. In each of these respects, secret evidence contradicts a core
goal and value of adjudication and, for this reason, courts must be
steadfast in refusing to allow it where the encroachment on accuracy and
fairness goes too far. In some adjudicative contexts, above all in criminal
trials, dangers arising from the use of secret evidence cannot be
remedied by procedural adaptation.8 On the other hand, the conflict of
interest in hidden government9 also calls for judges and other
adjudicators to review actively a range of executive decisions that rely
on confidential information and that affect the rights or interests of an
individual. In some areas outside the criminal context, such as
government decisions to deny a request for access to privileged
information or to authorize a search warrant or to deny security
clearance to a person, the limitations arising from secrecy are necessary
or even desirable because, without them, independent review of the
executive would be impossible. For this reason, it is appropriate for these

6

Charkaoui, supra, note 1, at paras. 50 and 63-65.
Id., at para. 34.
8
U.K., Joint Committee on Human Rights, Counter-Terrorism Policy and Human Rights:
Prosecution and Pre-Charge Detention (2005-06 H.L. 240, H.C. 1576), at para. 105.
9
M. Rankin, “National Security: Information, Accountability, and the Canadian Security
Intelligence Service” (1986) 36 U.T.L.J. 249, at 252; E.K. Yamamoto, “White (House) Lies: Why
the Public Must Compel the Courts to Hold the President Accountable for National Security
Abuses” (2004) 68 Law & Contemp. Probs. 285, at 288-89 and 315-16; Note, “The National
Security Interest and Civil Liberties” (1972) 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1130, at 1219 [hereinafter “Note,
‘The National Security Interest’”].
7
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limitations to be ameliorated, to the greatest extent possible, by
adaptation of the adjudicative process.
In cases of immigration-based detention — the subject of Charkaoui
— secret evidence is used to justify long-term incarceration of the
individual, thus involving a clear deprivation of personal liberty. Given
the context, one would expect the Court to elaborate in clear terms the
limitations presented by secret evidence and to take a strong position
against its use. In a number of respects the Court did just that. However,
in other respects, its reasons are open to criticism. Although the Court
clearly recognized and sought to address limitations that arise from the
absence of the individual from closed proceedings, its reasons do not
convey sufficient concern for other weaknesses arising from secret
evidence, in particular: (1) the dependency of the judge and special
advocates on the executive for access to the full record that underlies the
secret evidence presented to the Court; and (2) the pre-eminence of the
executive’s institutionalized expertise in matters of national security
confidentiality. This argument is presented via a broader examination of
the limitations that characterize adjudication when secret evidence is
permitted, which serves as a platform for evaluating the Court’s
identification of both the limitations and the procedural mechanisms that
might ameliorate them. The argument leads to the conclusion that a more
comprehensive consideration of the limitations arising from secret
evidence calls not only for surrogate representation of the individual in
closed proceedings but also for the provision of both independent
expertise and an independent investigative capacity to enable more
effective scrutiny of the executive by judges and special advocates alike.

II. THE LIMITATIONS OF ADJUDICATIVE DECISION-MAKING IN
CLOSED PROCEEDINGS
Courts face various obstacles when confronted with secret evidence.
In this article they are organized into four categories. The first includes
those limitations arising from the denial of access by the individual to
the evidence that is advanced by the state, and the corresponding
inability of the judge to hear information and argument that can be put
forward only if the individual is made aware of that evidence. The
second category, similar to the first, includes limitations arising from the
absence of the public from the proceeding and the inability of the court
to hear facts and expertise that can be made available only by involving
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persons who are not directly affected by the proceedings. The third
category arises from the courts’ special reliance on the executive, often
including foreign governments, to supply and characterize confidential
information and to justify the case for secrecy. Fourth is the dynamic of
closed proceedings in the security context and its potential to influence
judges to favour unduly the interests of secrecy and security over the
demands of the adjudicative process for accurate and fair decisionmaking. Each of these categories is discussed in this section with
reference to the Court’s reasons in Charkaoui.
1. The Absence of the Individual
The first area of limitations in closed proceedings arises from the
inability of the individual to present a reply to claims against him or her
by probing or elaborating on the record and by disputing the state’s
factual and legal claims.10 The absence of the individual means that
hallmarks of the adversarial process are “rendered impotent”.11 The court
is deprived of the fruits of an independent, self-interested investigation
in response to that of the executive.12 It will not hear exculpatory
evidence that the individual alone can provide or uncover and the state’s
witnesses will escape the disciplines of cross-examination by the other
side.13 In terms of legal argument, the court will not hear the individual’s
perspective, properly informed, on issues such as the validity of the
state’s confidentiality claims, the admissibility of secret evidence, the
appropriate weight to give to the evidence, and so on.14 As a result,
10

Kanda v. Government of the Federation of Malaya, [1962] A.C. 322, at 337 (P.C.), Lord
Denning; Engel v. The Netherlands (1976), 22 E.C.H.R. (Ser A), 27 E.H.R.R. 647, at para. 91;
Charkaoui, supra, note 1, at para. 54. Note, “Secret Evidence in the War on Terror” (2005) 118
Harv. L. Rev. 1962, at 1973-75 [hereinafter “Note, ‘Secret Evidence’”].
11
Kiareldeen v. Reno, 71 F. Supp. 2d 402, at 413 (D.N.J. 1999). E. Yaroshefsky, “Secret
Evidence is Slowly Eroding the Adversary System: CIPA and FISA in the Courts” (2006) 34
Hofstra L. Rev. 1063, at 1066 and 1071 [hereinafter “Yaroshefsky”].
12
Charkaoui, supra, note 1, at para. 50. J.K. Hugessen, “Watching the Watchers:
Democratic Oversight” (Paper presented to the Canadian Institute for the Administration of Justice’s
conference on Terrorism, Law and Democracy: How is Canada changing following September 11?,
March 25-26, 2002) at 384-85 [hereinafter “Hugessen”]. Council of Europe, Commissioner for
Human Rights, Report by Mr. Alvaro-Gil Robles, Commissioner for Human Rights, On His Visit to
the United Kingdom 4th-12th November 2004, Comm.D.H. (2005) 6 (8 January 2005), at para. 21.
13
United States ex. rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 339 U.S. 537, at 551 (1950) (Jackson J.,
dissenting). Yaroshefsky, supra, note 11, at 1075 (highlighting the common law belief in crossexamination as “the engine that drives the trial process”).
14
Charkaoui, supra, note 1, at para. 52; Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, at 823-25 (D.C.
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974). Yaroshefsky, id., at 1071.
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essential safeguards of the adversarial process for ensuring the accuracy
and completeness of adjudicative decision-making are lost.
Faced with these constraints arising from the absence of the
individual, the judge in a closed hearing must attempt to challenge
directly the executive’s case on behalf of the individual.15 Thus, the
judge must think both as arbiter and as litigant in the review of the
written record, the questioning of state witnesses, and the search for
additional evidence that benefits the individual. At each stage of the
process, however, the judge will be less able than counsel would be, in
representing the individual, for two reasons. First, the judge has no
access to information that the individual would otherwise share with his
or her counsel in privileged discussions about how to prepare for and
present the case.16 The judge may not hear whether the accused benefits
from an alibi at a key time or whether there is an innocent explanation
for allegedly suspicious behaviour, for example.17 Second, unlike the
individual’s counsel, the judge must exercise restraint when probing the
evidence and argument of the executive in order to protect the court’s
neutrality. A judge can compensate for this — by questioning the state’s
witnesses aggressively, for example — only at risk of undermining his
or her position as ultimate decision-maker. As “the only person in the
justice system whose sole obligation and loyalty is to the defendant”,18
an individual’s own counsel is the only actor in the process whose duty
is to focus completely on advocacy for the individual.
These limitations of closed proceedings were identified and
elaborated by the Court in Charkaoui. In its discussion of what the
principles of fundamental justice require in cases where section 7 is
engaged, the Court found that closed proceedings precluded an impartial
and independent magistrate, here the Federal Court judge, from making
a decision based on all the facts and law. The Court stated that in a
closed proceeding “the named person may be deprived of access to some
or all of the information put against him or her, which would deny the
person the ability to know the case to meet” and that as a result “the
15
P. Duff, “Disclosure of Evidence and Public Interest Immunity” (2007) 10 Scots L.
Times 63, at 66.
16
Hugessen, supra, note 12, at 384.
17
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, at 1069 (9th Cir.
1995).
18
J.L. Dratel, “Ethical Issues in Defending a Terrorism Case: How Secrecy and Security
Impair the Defense of a Terrorism Case” (2003) 2 Cardozo Pub. L., Policy & Ethics J. 81, at 81
(emphasis in original) [hereinafter “Dratel”].
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named person may not be in a position to contradict errors, identify
omissions, challenge the credibility of informants or refute false
allegations”.19 In turn, the Court stated that the judge’s decision may not
be based on all the relevant facts and, in terms of legal argument, that:
“Similar concerns arise with respect to the requirement that the decision
be based on the law. Without knowledge of the information put against
him or her, the named person may not be in a position to raise legal
objections relating to the evidence, or to develop legal arguments based
on the evidence.”20 Finally, the Court recognized that a judge, sitting
alone in a closed proceeding, “simply cannot fulfill the vacuum left by
the removal of the traditional guarantees of a fair hearing” because the
judge “is … not in a position to compensate for the lack of informed
scrutiny, challenge and counter-evidence that a person familiar with the
case could bring”.21
The Court thus made clear that the individual’s inability to access
secret evidence prevented the judge from reaching a properly informed
decision and that this was inconsistent with the requirement for a fair
hearing consistent with the principles of fundamental justice. In light of
this conclusion, the Court went on to discuss how the process of a closed
hearing might be adapted in ways that would allow the state to rely on
secret evidence in order to justify long-term detention, while also
satisfying the minimal impairment standard under section 1 of the
Charter. In its discussion of alternative procedural approaches, the Court
mentioned several alternatives to represent more effectively the
individual’s interests in closed proceedings, including use of the United
Kingdom’s model of appointing a special advocate (described by the
Court as “an independent agent at the stage of judicial review to better
protect the named person’s interests”)22 or certain Canadian models
including reliance on counsel to the Security Intelligence Review
Committee or on amicus curiae (and commission counsel, presumably)
to the Arar Inquiry. The Court did not endorse a specific alternative,
describing the ones it listed only as “less intrusive alternatives” and as
mechanisms that “illustrate that the government can do more to protect
the individual while keeping critical information confidential”.23
19
20
21
22
23

Charkaoui, supra, note 11, at para. 54.
Id., at para. 52.
Id., at paras. 63 and 64, respectively.
Id., at para. 3.
Id., at paras. 70 and 87.
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The Government of Canada’s response to Charkaoui, however, was
to adopt in Bill C-3 the alternative of a special advocates regime,24
leading naturally to the question whether special advocates can fill the
gaps that are left in closed proceedings because of the absence of the
individual. Undoubtedly, it is preferable that a special advocate be
appointed than a judge left alone in the effort to compensate for the
individual’s absence. In particular, the special advocate is wellpositioned to advance legal argument from the individual’s perspective
(although he or she remains hampered by the inability to seek specific
instructions). They can also provide independent cross-examination of
the state’s case alongside the necessarily more circumspect scrutiny
exercisable by the judge. Yet it is important to clarify why special
advocates, like judges, cannot fulfil the ordinary role of counsel in an
adversarial process.25 They are unable to hear information, known only
to the individual, that may exonerate the individual or otherwise weaken
the state’s case. Potential witnesses may not be contacted, important
documents may not be uncovered and the individual’s own investigation
of the case will be limited to material disclosed by the government.26 The
individual will be “unable to explain himself … and assist in his own
defence” meaning that the surrogate counsel “cannot effectively use the
evidence by asking her client questions pertaining to the evidence”.27 In
light of this limitation, it is an open question whether the appointment of
special advocates will satisfy the minimal impairment requirement under
section 1 with respect to limitations that arise from the absence of the
individual, not to mention other limitations of closed proceedings which
special advocates are not well positioned to address, as discussed below.
Ultimately, the special advocate is but another layer of procedural

24
Bill C-3, An Act to amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (certificate and
special advocate) and to make a consequential amendment to another Act, S.C. 2008, c. 3. For an
analysis of Bill C-3, see D. Dunbar & S. Nesbitt, “Parliament’s Response to Charkaoui: Bill C-3
and the Special Advocate Regime under IRPA” (2008) 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) 415 [hereinafter “Dunbar &
Nesbitt”].
25
Re MB, [2007] U.K.H.L. 46, at para. 35 (U.K.H.L.) (Lord Bingham). U.K., H.C.
Constitutional Affairs Committee, The Operation of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission
(SIAC) and the use of Special Advocates, 7th Report, Sess. 2004-05, vol. 1, at 55 [hereinafter
“Constitutional Affairs Committee”]; N. Blake et al., Letter, The Times, February 7, 2004
[hereinafter “Blake et al.”].
26
Yaroshefsky, supra, note 11, at 1073-74; Dratel, supra, note 18, at 90.
27
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F.Supp.2d 152, at 168 (D.D.C. 2004) (quoting oral argument
by Mr. Hamdan’s counsel). N.W. Smith, “Evidence and Confrontations in the President’s Military
Commissions” (2005) 33 Hastings Const. L.Q. 83, at 92.
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construction built upon a process that remains limited for other reasons
related to secret evidence.
2. The Absence of the Public
The second category of limitations arises from the obvious point that
the general public has no access to closed proceedings. The absence of
the public raises concerns, not only for the accountability of the state to
the electorate (an issue which is assumed here to be outweighed by the
security interest) but also more directly for the adjudicative process.
First, as in the case of the individual’s absence, keeping the evidence
secret means that third parties who have relevant information, but who
can come forward only if they are made aware of the evidence, cannot
do so. They will not hear about the case from the individual, from the
media, or otherwise, and this poses the risk, beyond that in open
proceedings, that the adjudicative decision will be founded on an
incomplete or inaccurate record. Revealing the evidence to a
representative of the individual (or even to the individual directly) on
condition of confidentiality does not permit third parties to be uncovered
by follow-up investigation or to come forward of their own accord.
Second, the absence of the public interferes with the judge’s ability
to look behind the state’s case and its reasons for secrecy. The necessity
of systematic secrecy in matters of national security necessarily means
that courts are less able to hear from independent experts, for the simple
reason that very few people outside of government can develop
sophisticated and specifically informed expertise in the field, even if
they were permitted to comment on the evidence and the rationales for
secrecy that are put forward in a closed proceeding. The executive
becomes by default the judge’s guide to the exotic world of security and
intelligence and it is tasked, as such, with the critical function of
outlining the state’s security priorities, the details of its informationsharing practices, the motivations of foreign governments, the strengths
and weaknesses of investigative techniques, and so on. Of course, there
are experts in the field who may be retired from the security agencies or
otherwise in a position to offer expertise that is credible because it is
informed by years of exposure to the technical subject matter. That said,
such experts may be tainted by past connections to government and,
where they are not, it remains the case that the pool of experts from
which to draw persons who can counter the expert evidence of the state
is much smaller than for matters dealt with commonly in open
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proceedings. This of course does not mean that sensitive information
should be released in order to support the development of a wider base
of expertise in the field. It simply constitutes another factor for the courts
to consider in deciding whether it is right to allow the use of secret
evidence and, if so, to adopt measures oriented to ameliorating the
corresponding limitations.
Lastly, when proceedings are closed and when they are known by
the participants to be very likely to remain closed for the long term, the
discipline that openness otherwise delivers is eroded. Ultimately,
openness is central to the legal process because it impels everyone
involved, including the judge, to be aware that their arguments and
reasoning can be read and picked apart by anyone, so that they will more
assuredly consider the implications of what they do or decide for their
reputation and for that of the system. In closed proceedings, the
executive may be tempted to adopt positions that de-emphasize the
rights or interests of individuals, or that presents the facts or law in ways
that would not be feasible in an open proceeding, for reasons of
openness. And, where an adjudicator or adjudicative tribunal is
otherwise perceived (rightly or wrongly) as predisposed to favour the
state’s interests, closure of the proceedings will accentuate the challenge
to public confidence in the process. Bentham described publicity as “the
very soul of justice … the keenest spur to exertion and the surest of all
guards against improbity”28 and there is likewise no surer spark for
cynicism about public decision-making than the knowledge that those in
power can lawfully conceal what they do from outside scrutiny.29 It is for
this reason that allowances for secrecy require rigorous mechanisms of
accountability and, where the risk of error or abuse is too great, for the
outright prohibition of secret evidence.
In Charkaoui, the Court does not discuss overtly these issues arising
from the absence of the public, although it is arguably inherent in the
Court’s finding that closed proceedings deny the judge access to relevant
facts and law. Also, it is perhaps understandable that the Court would
not discuss in detail these concerns given that the Court’s decision to
allow closed proceedings, with sufficient safeguards, where a section 7
right is engaged carries with it the implication that the absence of the
28

J. Bentham, “Draught of a New Plan for the Organization of the Judicial Establishment
in France” in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol. 4 (Edinburgh: Tait, 1843), at 316.
29
Note, “Keeping Secrets: Congress, the Courts, and National Security Information”
(1990) 103 Harv. L. Rev. 906, at 910-14.
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public is not a sufficient reason in itself to bar the use of secret evidence.
The Court clearly sees a role for secret evidence where required in the
security interest to satisfy “the imperative of the protection of society”.30
Yet the absence of the public should not be ignored from a section 7
perspective given the central role of openness in advancing the claims of
adjudication to accuracy and fairness. It is a necessary feature of the
individual’s absence that his or her own investigation of the state’s case
— which might otherwise identify members of the public of whose
testimony the court should be made aware — cannot happen. However,
special advocates are likewise precluded from canvassing third parties
for relevant information, whereas some of the other alternatives
canvassed by the Court in Charkaoui, including SIRC and commissions
of inquiry, could address these concerns to a greater degree because of
their access to a more established repository of information and general
expertise on matters of security confidentiality, whether by tapping their
internal expertise (in the case of SIRC) or outside sources (in the case of
an inquiry). As with the absence of the individual, the limitations
following from the absence of the public cannot be rectified completely,
but they can be minimized to a greater extent than by the appointment of
special advocates.
3. The Dependence on the Executive
The third category follows from the special dependency of the
adjudicative process on the executive in closed proceedings. The court
depends on the executive, and above all its security arm, to be fair and
forthcoming in supplying confidential information, in depicting how the
information was acquired and vetted, and in producing additional
information that is in the state’s custody and that may be beneficial to
the individual. There are cases in which the courts’ trust on these matters
has been betrayed.31 For example, in the aftermath of the Arar Inquiry, it
30

Charkaoui, supra, note 1, at para. 61.
Dratel, supra, note 18, at 100; M. Scaperlanda, “Are We That Far Gone?: Due Process
and Secret Deportation Proceedings” (1996) Stan. L. & Policy Rev. 23, at 28; D. Cole, “Enemy
Aliens” (2002) 54 Stan. L. Rev. 953, at 1001-02; S.M. Akram & K.R. Johnson, “Race, Civil Rights,
and Immigration Law after September 11, 2001: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims” (2002) 58
N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 295, at 324-25; N.T. Saito, “The Enduring Effect of the Chinese
Exclusion Cases: The ‘Plenary Power’ Justification for On-Going Abuses of Human Rights” (2003)
10 Asian L.J. 13, at 19-20; Note, “Secret Evidence”, supra, note 10, at 1979-80; J. Lu, “How Terror
Changed Justice: A Call to Reform Safeguards That Protect Against Prosecutorial Misconduct”
(2006) 14 J. L. & Policy 377, at 379-80.
31
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was revealed that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police had misled a court
on the likelihood that secret evidence obtained from Syrian military
intelligence, and used to support an application by police for a warrant,
was the product of torture.32 This was disclosed to the public only after
the Inquiry litigated the issue and obtained a Federal Court ruling that
authorized disclosure, over the objections of the federal government,
which had blocked disclosure for more than two years on security
grounds. Judging from this experience, it can be surmised that, where an
executive agency has misled a court about the reliability of secret
evidence, the truth is unlikely to emerge without concerted pressure by
an independent force. Without independent review of specific cases of
possible misrepresentation by the executive, it is difficult for those on
the outside, including the courts, to know how widespread and how
serious the misuse of secrecy powers may be.33
Yet one need not suspect that security officials have actively misled
a judge in a particular case in order to accept that judicial review of the
executive in the national security context is shaped by how officials
present their activities and how they vet the information they have
collected before putting it before the court, and by their own
vulnerability to errors that open proceedings would be likely to uncover
or prevent.34 Even where officials act in good faith in the identification
and characterization of security concerns, they are more likely than not
to favour maintaining secrecy and guarding security. 35 However, the
integrity of adjudicative decision-making depends on the assurance that,
if an official succumbs to the temptation to spin or vet evidence in a way
that is misleading, there are ways for this to be detected. The one-sided
nature of closed hearings dilutes such assurances because, as discussed,
32
Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials Relating to Maher Arar,
Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar — Addendum — Disclosure of information authorized
by the Federal Court of Canada in accordance with Sections 38.04 and 38.06 of the Canada
Evidence Act (Ottawa: 2007), at 127-28. See also e.g., United States v. Moussaoui (No. Crim. 01455-A), 2002 W.L. 1311718 (E.D. Va., April 17, 2002); United States v. Koubriti, 336 F. Supp. 2d
676, at 679, n. 3 (E.D. Mich. 2004).
33
The U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court recently condemned the Federal
Bureau of Investigation for giving false or misleading evidence in 75 security warrant cases under
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: In re Sealed Case, 218 F.Supp.2d 611, at 620 (2002),
revd, 310 F. 3d 717, at 735 (2002). D.V. Ward, “Confidential Informants in National Security
Investigations” (2006) 47 Boston College L. Rev. 627, at 631-32 [hereinafter “Ward”].
34
E. Margulies, “Above Contempt?: Regulating Government Overreaching in Terrorism
Cases” (2005) Southwestern U. L. Rev. 449, at 476 [hereinafter “Margulies”]; G.E. Rosen,
“Remarks of Judge Gerald E. Rosen — The War on Terrorism in the Courts” (2004) 21 T.M.
Cooley L. Rev. 159, at 168; Note, “The National Security Interest”, supra, note 9, at 1134.
35
Blake et al., supra, note 25, at 7.

262

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2008), 42 S.C.L.R. (2d)

neither the individual in question nor the public can comment on the
state’s claims. In closed hearings, the only experts (whether legal or nonlegal) who are present in the room are persons with exclusive access to
and control over the information under consideration, and thus an
incomparably specialized expertise in the most arcane of fields.36 Where
a judge is not swayed by “nightmarish tales of national security
problems”,37 he or she will face much difficulty peeling away any layers
of obfuscation or uncovering any subtle bending of the truth on the part
of the executive.
This is illustrated by the case of informer evidence. Information
from human sources must be assessed not just in terms of the informer’s
reliability — whether he or she has invented a story because of a grudge
or an interest to avoid prosecution or deportation38 — but also in light of
other information held by the state that undermines the informer’s
credibility. To carry out such an assessment in a closed proceeding, the
judge must hear about the circumstances of the informer’s relationship
with police or security agents, the accuracy of information supplied in
the past, information from other sources that supports or undermines the
informer’s account, and so on. The judge relies entirely on the executive
to be forthcoming on these questions. Moreover, in some instances, the
executive itself will not be in a position to provide reliable answers, even
where it is intent on doing so, where for example the agency does not
itself have a significant relationship with the informer, he or she being
located abroad, or where the informer is passing on information heard
from other sources with which the agency has no contact at all.
Limitations arising from a special dependency on the executive are
recognized by the Court in Charkaoui, if somewhat tangentially. For
example, this concern is probably implicit in the following statement by
the Court (also excerpted above):
The judge … simply cannot fill the vacuum left by the removal of the
traditional guarantees of a fair hearing. The judge sees only what the
ministers put before him or her. The judge, knowing nothing else
about the case, is not in a position to identify errors, find omissions
or assess the credibility and truthfulness of the information in the
way the named person would be.
36
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Likewise, the judge is described by the Court as being “placed in the
situation of asking questions and ultimately deciding the issues on the
basis of incomplete and potentially unreliable information”.
What is not clear in the Court’s reasoning, however, is whether it
speaks in these passages of the dependency of the judge as caused
simply by the absence of the individual or whether it speaks more
generally of the special vulnerabilities of courts to executive manipulation
where secret evidence is allowed, vulnerabilities which may or may not
be removed by alternative mechanisms that aim to substitute for the
individual’s absence but that do not necessarily address the wider
dependency.
In its reasons, the Court intertwined dependency on the executive
with the absence of the individual although, as argued here, these may be
regarded as separate concerns. For example, in this statement, the Court
may be read as having merged the two sets of limitations:
The judge is not afforded the power to independently investigate all
relevant facts that true inquisitorial judges enjoy. At the same time,
since the named person is not given a full picture of the case to meet,
the judge cannot rely on the parties to present missing evidence. The
result is that, at the end of the day, one cannot be sure that the judge
has been exposed to the whole factual picture.39

Again, it is unclear whether the Court’s lack of confidence as to
whether the judge “has been exposed to the whole factual picture” arises
from the individual’s absence alone or from the judge’s inability to
investigate the underlying informational base of the case as in a
genuinely inquisitorial process. One possible reading of Charkaoui is
that the demands of minimal impairment will be satisfied if the concerns
arising from the absence of the individual are adequately addressed,
regardless of related concerns arising from a wider dependency on the
executive.
On the other hand, there are suggestions in some parts of the Court’s
reasons of a greater concern about dependency beyond that conveyed by
the Charkaoui decision as a whole. This comes especially in the Court’s
discussion of whether the process under the Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act, relying on review by a Federal Court judge, allowed for
review by “an independent and impartial magistrate”. The Court
concluded that the process satisfied this component of the requirement
39
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for a fair hearing (although it did not satisfy the component of a decision
based on all relevant facts and law) on the basis that judges of the
Federal Court can and do conduct a searching review of the state’s
claims. In doing so, however, the Court framed its conclusion in
lukewarm terms, saying that “a non-deferential role for the designated
judge goes some distance toward alleviating the first concern, that the
judge will be perceived to be in the camp of the government”.40 This
conveys at least a residual concern that the judge’s position in a closed
proceeding entails a troubling dependence on the executive.
In fact, regardless of their commitment to doing so, judges
frequently are not well equipped to carry out a reliably thorough review
of the executive’s claims in closed proceedings. To borrow a phrase used
to describe the past role of the Federal Court in security certificate
proceedings, judges are reliant on the executive in their ability to
“closely examine the information to look for the presence or absence of
corroboration, and carefully scrutinize the credibility of human sources”,41
because the use of secret evidence entails a decision by the executive to
put forward some but not all the confidential information it holds and to
present the evidence it does advance in ways that support the state’s
case. This handicap is inherent to closed proceedings in the security field
because, by definition, the evidence that must be presented secretly has
originated in places that are also closely guarded from outside scrutiny;
dependency is the unavoidable outcome of restricted access. Whether
this poses insurmountable obstacles for the adjudicator in a specific
proceeding depends in part on the executive’s claims and the nature of
the evidence advanced to support them. Without vetting the informational
base, however, it will be very difficult for a court to know with any
confidence whether the case is indeed one in which the executive has
something to hide.
To emphasize the intractability of this dependency, let us consider
the use of secret evidence of an intelligence report that is received from a
foreign government subject to a commitment by the receiving state on
the promise it be kept confidential. Such foreign-sourced information
presents a special quandary. Faced with it, a court must scrutinize not
only its own agencies but also those of the foreign government that
supplied the report and the ultimate human or technical sources on which
the report is based. In reviewing the role of each actor, and there are
40
41
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many at play, the court must assess whether information was passed on
erroneously, whether relevant material was withheld at some point in the
chain of information-sharing, whether unreliable or unacceptable methods
of interrogation or surveillance were utilized, whether the foreign
government or the ultimate source may have an interest to deceive the
receiving state or the court for its own ends, and so on. However, in
pursuing this assessment, it may be impossible for a court, or even its
own state’s agencies, to know with any confidence how the foreign
government acquired the information or whether it was filtered through
other sources. The court has little if any power to look behind the
information directly because the state that receives it has no coercive
authority in the territory of the state or states in which the information
was elicited and conveyed. Could one ever hope to discover the original
message in a game of telephone by asking questions only of the final
recipient of the call?
With respect to Charkaoui, it is important to distinguish the
limitations arising from dependency on the executive from those arising
from the absence of the individual in order to evaluate alternative
mechanisms that could be used to satisfy the requirement of minimal
impairment under section 1. It is especially important, in light of Bill C-3,
to clarify that a special advocate is likewise dependent on the executive
to be forthcoming and accurate about the confidential information in its
custody.42 Special advocates must look to the executive to disclose
information that may undermine the state’s case, to characterize
accurately the nature and relevance of the executive’s investigation, to
engage in good faith information sharing with other governments, to
insulate their use of confidential information from other interests of the
state, to eschew unacceptable methods of information gathering, to
reveal activities of an informer that undermine the informer’s credibility,
to carry out internal review and fair redaction of materials for purposes
of disclosure and to act to prevent unofficial leaks against the individual.
A special advocate has no way to audit the executive by probing its files,
by formulating a wider view of state investigations, or by inquiring more
deeply into the reliability of foreign-sourced information.
The presence of a special advocate thus makes it more likely that
probing questions will be asked in closed proceedings, but it does
42
C. Forcese & L. Waldman, “Seeking Justice in an Unfair Process — Lessons from
Canada, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand on the Use of ‘Special Advocates’ in National
Security Proceedings” (Study for the Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, August
2007), at 40-43.

266

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2008), 42 S.C.L.R. (2d)

comparatively little to enhance the court’s ability to rely on the veracity
and completeness of the answers given by the executive. The special
advocate depends as much as the judge on the executive to account for
the individual’s interest at each stage of the process, from the earliest
delineation of lines of investigation, to the posing of questions to
informers and foreign governments, to the selection of witnesses, to the
presentation of evidence to the court, to the formulation of any public
comment on the court’s ultimate decision. Moreover, special advocates
are also more constrained in this respect than at least two other
alternative mechanisms identified by the Court in Charkaoui, including
review by SIRC and by the Arar Inquiry. Both of these alternatives
allowed for an independent investigation to be conducted into the full
record of confidential information that is held by the executive, based on
the issuance of an order to produce relevant documents or require
officials to testify under oath. Special advocates lack the same
capability, nor is there any express authorization in Bill C-3 for a court
to grant such authority to a special advocate or some other entity on a
case-by-case basis.
In the English case of Re MB, the nature of the special advocate’s
dependency was elaborated more clearly by Sullivan J. of the High
Court.43 The case involved the use of secret evidence to justify a decision
by the U.K. Secretary of State under the Prevention of Terrorism Act
2005 to issue a non-derogating44 control order against an individual for
suspected involvement in terrorism. As part of his decision in that case
that the process for court review of the Secretary of State’s decision was
not consistent with the right to a fair hearing under Article 6 of the
European Convention on Human Rights, Sullivan J. made this comment

43
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on the employment of special advocates to ameliorate the unfairness of
closed proceedings:
While the special advocate can explore, for example, whether the
closed materials placed before the Secretary of State ignored any lines
of inquiry which were obvious at that time and which should have been
pursued … he is not required to examine what was actually known to
the Secretary of State’s informant, the Security Service, or whether any
of the closed material on which the Secretary of State based his
suspicion was in fact true … In particular, the Special Advocate does
not have a roving commission to ascertain whether there might be new
exculpatory material, or whether, for example, viewed in the light of
the respondent’s explanations which were not available to the
Secretary of State, a different interpretation might be given to the
closed material.45

This statement elucidates the root dependency of special advocates
(and judges) in closed proceedings. It is a dependency that stems from
the foreclosure of any independent investigation (whether or not by the
individual and his or her counsel) of the underlying base of information
from which executive officials have selected the material put before the
court. By this process of selection, the evidentiary record is shaped in a
potentially one-sided way and it is tenuous to allow the detention of an
individual based simply on the executive’s duty “to act in utmost good
faith and … make full, fair and candid disclosure of the facts, including
those that may be adverse to its interests”.46 In its decision to uphold the
process of closed review (subsequently struck down by the Supreme
Court of Canada) in Charkaoui, the Federal Court of Appeal made much
of the court’s ability to review effectively the state’s case based, in
significant part, on the good faith of the executive. However, without a
meaningful prospect that the executive’s choices in framing the subject
matter and evidentiary record of closed proceedings can be reviewed —
via an independent audit that is at least as likely to reveal
misrepresentation by the executive as would be the case in analogous
open proceedings — it is doubtful that a judge can deliver a reliably
thorough review, even when the court is assisted by a special advocate.

45
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4. The Dynamic of Closed Proceedings
A final aspect of closed proceedings in the security context is that
unlike other proceedings (including other confidential proceedings) they
may take on a dynamic that conditions or impels the judge, sometimes in
subtle ways, to favour the position of the executive over that of the
individual and, more broadly, over the administration of justice. This
conditioning of the adjudicator is in part the outcome of the various sets
of limitations already discussed — absence of the individual and the
public, and dependence on the executive — which also contribute to the
creation of an adjudicative environment in which security concerns are
allocated a privileged status because of their more direct and enabled
representation before the court. Besides this, however, the courts may
lean toward the executive’s position for more diffuse reasons arising
from the dynamic of the proceedings itself and from the nature of the
issues that are likely to arise in the security field.47
Let us first consider the atmosphere and dynamic of closed
proceedings. Other than the judge and a handful of court staff, the
hearings will be attended by government counsel, government witnesses
and government observers. The executive’s presence looms large before
the judge, physically and psychologically, serving as a steady and highly
visible reminder of the state’s overarching interest. This need not
influence the judge such that he or she consciously decides that
executive priorities should crowd out other concerns. But it can create
home field advantage for the state in terms of the atmosphere of the
hearing room and it will put more pressure on the judge who seeks
actively to question the state’s claims. Closed proceedings are
necessarily a bunkered space, reflecting the security realm in general,
populated by those whose mission is to identify and counter threats and
whose training and working life understandably presses in favour of
secrecy over the need to disclose confidential information (or abandon a
legal claim) in order to respect the integrity of adjudication.
The challenge springs to a large extent from the significance and
sheer complexity of evaluating secret evidence, predicting how its
release could harm security, weighing this risk against the importance of
openness and fairness (or of allowing the state’s legal case to proceed),
devising ways to maximize disclosure without allowing the minutiae of
document review to overwhelm the process, and regulating compliance
47
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with orders to release information. In examining these questions, the
courts must be acutely sensitive to the difficulties faced by the security
agencies. They must scrupulously avoid the danger of “unnecessary and
amateurish interference”48 given that a single ill-timed disclosure can
destroy years of work and planning. On the other hand, the courts must
also not be over-awed; judges, as Narain put it, “ought not to panic at the
mere mention of national security and abdicate their inherent power in
common law”.49 It is the courts that have the expertise and the ultimate
duty to ensure that the magnetic attraction of national security does not
lead to an erosion of legal principles, outside of situations of genuine
national emergency.50 A security agency does not have the expertise
required to avoid and manage the dangers that secrecy brings to
adjudicative decision-making, and its views as to whether and how a rule
or principle should be altered in order to facilitate closed proceedings on
security grounds will naturally be affected by its responsibilities to
counter security threats.
Yet in the security context, especially in closed proceedings, the
courts are encumbered by a well-recognized lack of relevant expertise
and capability,51 explaining much of the courts’ tendency to accept
executive appeals for deference in this area.52 Security concerns,
including the implications of releasing confidential information, are
often extraordinarily multi-faceted, requiring careful vigilance and
frequent re-assessment, and the nature of security threats will be much
clearer to those officials who have a dedicated and focused mandate to
protect security. It would be exceedingly difficult, if not simply
unrealistic, to expect a judge to be well versed in the full panoply of
threats from diverse organizations and countries, and how best to
respond to them. The issues may range from the novelty of investigative
techniques, to the effectiveness of data-mining software, to the
conditions of a witness’ imprisonment in a foreign country, to the
48
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motivations of a foreign agency to share information, to the immutability
of caveats, and so on.53 More broadly, the terrain of inquiry in national
security has an especially opaque and high stakes quality in that the
threats are often not very clear to anyone, including the security agencies,
and yet are easily recognized as carrying potentially catastrophic
consequences.
This context for decision-making has the potential to amplify a
judge’s sense of inadequacy and unpreparedness to overrule the
executive in security matters. Faced with the complexity and urgency of
the security interest, a judge may accept the state’s claims in part
because he or she is not positioned to generate a credible alternative
from his or her own knowledge and expertise. It may appear futile or
hazardous, in particular, for the judge to attempt to determine the
outcome of a decision to disclose confidential information after
balancing the various interests that call for disclosure or for secrecy.
This points to the difficulty of relying on judges alone to address all of
the factual and legal dilemmas that arise where the state brings a claim
against an individual based on secret evidence. Designating judges who
have a background in national security to sit in such cases may enhance
a court’s ability to scrutinize effectively the state’s evidence and
argument (while also raising questions of impartiality) but it is not a
substitute for the systematic acquisition of dedicated knowledge and
expertise over years of focused and comprehensive work on the
assessment of security concerns. This first element of the dynamic of
closed proceedings, then, is the positioning of the judge in an
environment that is dominated by representatives of the security interest
and that requires the judge, in order to ensure accuracy and fairness in
the process, to be prepared to reject the executive’s characterization of
complex factual and expert evidence which itself demands great
deference in light of security threats.
Added to this is the opportunity for the executive to pit the
complexities and uncertainties of national security interest against the
judge’s ability to maximize disclosure to the individual and to the public.
A judge will only be able to decide that confidential information can be
released, over the arguments of the executive, after a time consuming
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and probably testing interaction with executive officials in secret.54 The
process may begin with an inquiry by the court into the various pieces of
information in question and the rationales for secrecy in each case; with
the executive called upon to elaborate its position on the various
rationales advanced for secrecy — the protection of informers, the
protection of investigative interests, the honouring of caveats to foreign
states — and how each rationale plays out with respect to different units
of fact or evidence that the executive seeks to withhold. As well, to the
extent that any secrecy is permissible in the relevant legal context,
consideration will need to be given to the different methods available to
enable disclosure, to the extent possible, including the release of an
adequate portion or summary of the evidence.55 Where the evidence as a
whole is voluminous, the court may elect to reach decisions about
disclosure in terms of classes rather than individual items of information,
in which case the court’s decisions will then need to be applied to the
precise language of relevant documents, transcripts, recordings and so on.
Thus, the review of the state’s confidentiality claims in a closed
proceeding is detailed and laborious. It calls for the meticulous study,
vetting, and classification of the alleged facts, other information
produced by the executive, and other relevant information not uncovered
or produced by the executive (such as media reports). Myriad factual and
legal issues will arise as proposed rationales for secrecy are applied to
different subject matter. The relationship between the reasons for and
against disclosure may well be fluid, requiring ongoing review as
knowledge of the risks evolves or as additional information finds its way
onto the public record (whether by official release, government leaks,
whistle blowing, or otherwise).56 The process can be infuriatingly
cumbersome and complex, all the more so where the executive
encourages the unfolding of a contest of attrition in which the judge is
disadvantaged.57 Moreover, the judge has a responsibility to resolve the
case within a reasonable time frame, a responsibility of which the
executive will be aware and able to exploit. The danger is that the judge,
54
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sitting in secret and facing a daunting struggle with the executive, will
over time be deterred from undertaking the exhaustive review that is
required to tailor release in the interests of maximum disclosure and, by
extension, accuracy and fairness.58 Thus, the dynamic of closed
proceedings may prompt the judge to choose secrecy over disclosure as a
practical option to contend with a seemingly endless stream of security
concerns. Where the court’s sails begin to tack in this direction, who
other than the executive will see the change?
On the dynamic of closed proceedings, the Court in Charkaoui does
not elaborate concerns along the lines of the issues discussed here.
Indeed, the Court rejects the argument that the circumstances of closed
proceedings “may give rise to a perception” that the judge “may not be
entirely independent and impartial as between the state and the person
named”59 on the basis that Federal Court judges do not adopt an overly
deferential approach and may be said to possess relative expertise over
the minister (although not, presumably, other security officials) on the
matters at issue. Thus, the Court found that, although the judge is “the
only person capable of providing the essential judicial component of the
process” and although the hearing may take place “with only the judge
and the government lawyers in the room”, this was not inconsistent with
the requirements of independence and impartiality in a fair judicial
process.60 Even so, as noted earlier, the Court was somewhat circumspect
in its concluding statement on this point that “a non-deferential role for
the designated judge goes some distance toward alleviating the first
concern, that the judge will be perceived to be in the camp of the
government”.61 These statements suggest that the Court, even if it saw a
possibility for the dynamic of closed proceedings to favour the state’s
interest, it was not so troubled by this possibility as to found a violation
of section 7 on this limitation alone.
Further, the appointment of a special advocate will make an
important difference in counteracting this limitation arising from the use
of secret evidence. His or her presence allows someone other than the
judge to bear the burden of confronting the state, thus reducing concerns
that the judge might otherwise be deterred by the complexity and
uncertainty of national security or otherwise shy away from an
58
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exhausting battle with the executive over disclosure. The special
advocate is there to emphasize the individual’s interests where the
executive prefers them to be suppressed, and to check the judge from
becoming too hesitant or comfortable in his or her working relationship
with the executive’s counsel and witnesses. Appointment of a special
advocate allows a clearer separation of the roles of judge and surrogate
representative and provides an alternative to the pre-eminence of the
executive in the hearing room.
Even so, the dynamic of closed proceedings remains an important
factor, especially when the court is dealing with a complex case
involving a large amount of confidential information (including the
underlying information base held by the executive). Special advocates
are, like judges, unlikely to have the specialized knowledge and
expertise that is required to counter the executive’s position in the
intricacies of national security, and are also vulnerable to obstruction and
exhaustion in the contest of attrition over the state’s confidentiality
claims.62 Unlike in other proceedings, special advocates are precluded
from turning to colleagues for advice on factual or legal issues that arise
unexpectedly after a case is underway. They cannot access outside
expertise or investigative resources, and are limited in their ability to
develop their own expertise or assemble evidence in a systematic way as
the process unfolds.63 The special advocate’s ability to counter possible
tendencies in favour of secrecy and security thus depends not only on his
or her dedication to advocate relentlessly for the individual, but also on
his or her access to additional resources, including administrative and
research support.

III. CONCLUSION
In Charkaoui, the Court adopted a qualified position against secret
evidence. It referred to the need to rely on confidential information, and
withhold evidence from the individual in immigration detention cases, as
a “reality of our modern world”.64 It also emphasized that the Charter
does not require a system of ideal procedural fairness, but rather one that
minimally impairs the rights of the individual. The Court accepted the
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need for accommodation even where a person’s liberty is at stake65 in
order to meet “the imperative of the protection of society”.66 Yet the
Court also applied constitutional controls on secret evidence as required
to satisfy “the basic principles that underlie our notions of justice and
fair process”.67 It required the state to justify closed proceedings under
section 1 of the Charter, and declined to incorporate security priorities as
a balancing factor within the concept of fundamental justice under
section 7. Further, the Court identified clearly a number of serious
limitations arising in adjudication when the individual is denied access
to the evidence, and clarified that relying on a judge alone to scrutinize
the state’s case is insufficient for a fair process. This set the groundwork
for the Court’s discussion of procedural adaptations to counter these
limitations, including the appointment of special advocates.
On the other hand, the Court was less attentive to other adjudicative
weaknesses following from secret evidence, including the difficulties of
countering the executive’s expertise due to the systemic absence of the
public, the prospect that a judge may be influenced to favour secrecy and
security in the face of the complexities and uncertainties of security
threats or in the contest of attrition with the executive over disclosure.
Most critically, the Court suggests, but does not elaborate on, a concern
that the judge is entirely dependent on the executive’s good faith in its
selection and depiction of secret evidence from other relevant
information over which the executive may have custody. Moreover,
some of these additional limitations, especially dependency on the
executive, apply to special advocates as well as judges in closed
proceedings. As such, the appointment of a special advocate in some
respects simply redistributes the burden of acquiring countervailing
expertise or resisting dependency to another actor who is as ill equipped
and vulnerable as the judge. Put differently, it is not enough to ask
whether special advocates can sufficiently compensate for the absence of
the individual from closed proceedings (even if they can never address
this weakness completely). One must also consider whether they, as well
as the judge, have access to credible expertise to rival that of the security
agencies and whether there exists a meaningful prospect for the full
record held by the executive to be reviewed independently. In these
respects, some of the other mechanisms discussed by the Court in
65
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Charkaoui, namely review by SIRC or by a commission of inquiry, are
better equipped than special advocates because of their ability to access
institutionalized expertise and because of their statutory powers of
investigation.68
Other instruments may be available to courts to strengthen their
review capacity or that of special advocates. Courts can look to outside
expertise to counter the executive’s pre-eminence in security matters by
appointing friends of the court, temporary advisors, or special masters,
for example.69 The Federal Court in particular can appoint expert counsel
to attend closed hearings and offer advice alongside that of the
executive.70 In the United Kingdom, panels of the Special Immigration
Appeals Commission normally include a member who has worked in the
security agencies and has relevant expertise. These measures differ from
appointment of a special advocate in that they do not aim to compensate
for the individual’s absence, but rather for the lack of a well-informed
security perspective other than that of the security agencies. In
themselves, however, these measures are a partial step because they are
ad hoc and case specific, and thus limited in their potential to provide
compelling and up-to-date advice.
Another option is to establish a standing body tasked with developing
independent expertise on matters of national security confidentiality. The
role of such a body — let us call it an independent advisory body —
would be to support the courts in cases where the executive proposed to
rely on secret evidence to support a claim that an individual poses a
security threat. The body might also be called on to generate proposals
for the redaction or summarizing of evidence in closed proceedings, or
to organize contentious documents in order to identify representative
material for in-depth review by the court and by a special advocate.71 In
this respect, the body would allow the courts to avoid getting bogged
down in the myriad options for disclosure of individual items of
evidence, and thus to insulate themselves from the potential contest of
68
On the other hand, it is proper to ask whether special advocates may outperform these
alternatives in other respects — such as in their level of institutional independence from the
executive — in characterizing one’s expectations of the required procedural adaptations.
69
Note the U.S. courts’ occasional appointment of “special masters” to assist with
narrowing the legal and factual issues in closed proceedings under the Freedom of Information Act:
e.g., Washington Post v. United States Department of Defence, 766 F.Supp. 1, at 4 (Civil Action No.
84-3400-LFO) (D.D.C. 1991). M. Silverman, “National Security and the First Amendment: A
Judicial Role in Maximizing Public Access to Information” (2003) 78 Ind. L.J. 1101, at 1126.
70
Khadr v. Canada (Attorney General), [2008] F.C.J. No. 47, [2008] F.C. 46 (F.C.).
71
Deyling, supra, note 52, at 110.

276

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2008), 42 S.C.L.R. (2d)

attrition. On matters of security confidentiality generally, the body could
offer a detached perspective on the use and reliability of secret evidence,
and on the appropriateness of secrecy in different legal contexts. As a
standing body, it could develop as a repository of specialized expertise
in matters of security confidentiality which the courts and special
advocates could call on as they saw fit, including expertise on whether
and how to disclose different types of information in different legal
contexts. The body would be in a stronger position than the courts or
special advocates, or amicus curiae and temporary advisors, to acquire a
broad view on security confidentiality, for instance via systematic
research on policies and practices in different jurisdictions. It would, as
such, lessen the tendency toward undue deference that arises from
dependence on the executive, by allowing courts to hear well-informed
advice that is highly credible, when put alongside those of the executive,
because it originates in an established body and, importantly, because it
is segregated from the executive’s conflict of interest in hidden government.
Even so, neither a special advocate nor an independent advisory
body addresses satisfactorily the weaknesses arising from dependence on
the executive. To do so, these entities would require the ability to look
behind executive claims by auditing the full record that is accessible to
the state. In the security context, there is a unique need for investigative
audits of this sort because of the degree to which executive claims turn
on material that is not, and often will never be, on the public record. To
be effective, such investigations would require backing by the coercive
authority of the courts. Given this reliance on the courts’ authority, and
the need to protect against overuse, such investigations should be
authorized by the court subject to a specific mandate that focuses on
issues of concern in the case at hand. The purpose of an investigation
would not be to disprove the state’s case, but to examine security-related
facts or issues that are significantly in dispute between the executive and
either the special advocate or the individual. These might involve the
completeness of disclosure, the reliability of information produced, the
admissibility of foreign-sourced information, and so on.
Again, the objective is not to preclude the use of secret evidence
outright even if in some contexts its use will indeed be irreparably
unsafe and unfair. The aim is rather to facilitate adjudicative review that
minimizes the risks of error arising from secret evidence, and offers
robust checks against abuse, by employing well-tailored procedural
adaptations. Where viable mechanisms exist to strengthen the capacity
of the courts for effective review of secret evidence, those mechanisms
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should be put in place, above all where a fundamental right or freedom is
at stake, as it was in Charkaoui. Likewise, the full range of limitations
arising from secret evidence should be identified and assessed carefully
in order to inform the design of these procedures to guard against the
inherent sacrifice of accuracy and fairness. If governments elect to put
forward secret evidence and if, in doing so, they rely on the courts to
deliver the requisite checks, then they should be required also to equip
the courts properly for the task.

IV. POSTSCRIPT
The Supreme Court of Canada’s second Charkaoui decision72 was
released shortly after this article was completed. The decision is
significant because its reasoning acknowledges and seeks to address
certain limitations arising from the use of secret evidence that relates to
the interview notes of Canadian Security Intelligence Service (“CSIS”)
officials and especially from the unique dependency of judges on the
executive in closed proceedings.
The relevant facts of this second Charkaoui decision were as
follows. The security certificate issued by two ministers against Mr.
Charkaoui pursuant to section 77(1) of the Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act in May 2003 led to his arrest and detention until February
2005, when Noel J. of the Federal Court authorized Mr. Charkaoui’s
conditional release following a fourth review of his detention. Prior to
this fourth review, government counsel revealed to the judge that a
document that should have been disclosed to Mr. Charkaoui in May
2003 had not been disclosed because of an oversight. The document was
a summary of two CSIS interviews with Mr. Charkaoui in 2002.
After receiving a summary of the information, Mr. Charkaoui
requested disclosure of the complete notes and recordings of the CSIS
interviews. The government replied that there were no recordings in the
file and that notes of CSIS interviews are, according to CSIS policy,
systematically destroyed once the CSIS officers complete their reports.
In light of this, Mr. Charkaoui applied for a stay of proceedings and
requested that the security certificate against him be quashed. Justice
Noel dismissed the application, noting that CSIS was not a police agency
and that it was not subject to the disclosure duties of a police force under
criminal law. This decision was upheld by the Federal Court of Appeal.
72
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The Supreme Court allowed Mr. Charkaoui’s appeal in part. It found
that CSIS breached its duty to retain and disclose information pursuant
to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act.73 It found also that
existing case law on the disclosure and retention of information under
section 7 of the Charter required CSIS to retain all the information in its
possession relating to security certificate investigations and to disclose
that information to the relevant ministers and to the designated judge.
It was argued in the present article that, in a closed proceeding, the
judge is uniquely dependent on the executive to characterize and select
information that is introduced as secret evidence. The judge is not in a
position (nor is the individual, of course) to review the full record of
information held by the executive. As a result, greater opportunity for
error or abuse on the part of the executive arises than would be the case
if an extensive disclosure duty applied or if expanded opportunities for
independent investigation of the underlying record were available. In
Charkaoui, these concerns were exacerbated by the fact that the original
interview notes were destroyed and no recordings made, requiring the
judicial review process to rely only on interview summaries prepared by
CSIS officials.
These concerns were acknowledged, and steps were taken to address
them, in the reasons of LeBel and Fish JJ. for the Court. First, it was
concluded that CSIS’s policy to destroy original interview notes violated
the CSIS Act and that such notes are “a better source of information, and
of evidence, when they are submitted to the ministers responsible for
issuing a security certificate and to the designated judge who will
determine whether the certificate is reasonable”.74 Retention of the notes
would “make it easier to verify the disclosed summaries and information
based on those notes”.75 Notably, LeBel and Fish JJ. observed that CSIS
was criticized in an earlier decision of the Security Intelligence Review
Committee (“SIRC”)76 after a report submitted to SIRC by the Department
of Foreign Affairs was found to be inaccurate and misleading because
information provided by CSIS had been inaccurate and incomplete.
Justices LeBel and Fish cited this statement from paragraph 72 of the
SIRC decision:
73
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The issue of what was said during security screening interviews is a
perennial source of argument in the course of the Review Committee’s
investigation of complaints. Complainants frequently allege that the
investigator’s report of their interview is not accurate: that their answers
are incomplete, or have been distorted or taken out of context.77

Second, LeBel and Fish JJ. concluded that, although CSIS was not a
police agency, it was subject to a duty of disclosure going beyond mere
summaries of information relevant to security certificate proceedings.
Such proceedings were not criminal trials but, given that “[t]he
consequences of security certificates are often more severe than those of
many criminal charges”, the procedural fairness requirements under
section 7 required “a procedure for verifying the evidence adduced
against [the individual]”78 centring on review by the designated judge.
According to LeBel and Fish JJ.:
… If the original evidence was destroyed, the designated judge has
access only to summaries prepared by the state, which means that it
will be difficult, if not impossible, to verify the allegations. …
As things stand, the destruction by CSIS officers of their
operational notes compromises the very function of judicial review. To
uphold the right to procedural fairness of people in Mr. Charkaoui’s
position, CSIS should be required to retain all the information in its
possession and to disclose it to the ministers and the designated judge.
The ministers and the designated judge will in turn be responsible for
verifying the information they are given. …79

Lastly, LeBel and Fish JJ. linked these findings to the Court’s conclusion
regarding closed proceedings in the first Charkaoui decision, that
“[d]espite the judge’s best efforts to question the government’s witnesses
and scrutinize the documentary evidence, he or she is placed in the
situation of asking questions and ultimately deciding the issues on the
basis of incomplete and potentially unreliable information”.80 This
supports the view expressed in the present article that the first Charkaoui
decision also acknowledges, even if only implicitly, the unique
dependency of the judge on executive officials in closed proceedings and
the corresponding weaknesses of adjudication in the face of secret
evidence.
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